

**01458**

**1979/12/00**

Appendix A

Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence  
from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59

NARA PT

DATE 7-19-05

UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL  
USE ONLY

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

NO

DATE

11 December 1959

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.	DD/2	12/11/59	12/11/59	DD/2
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UNCLASSIFIED

11 December 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)  
SUBJECT: Cuban Problems.

This memorandum requests approval by the Director of the recommendations contained in paragraph 3.

1. Estimate of the Situation.

a. A dictatorship of the far left is now established. It is not only unfriendly to the United States in oral criticism, but has taken action against American properties, both industrial and agricultural, which, if permitted to stand, will encourage similar actions against U.S. holdings in other Latin American countries.

b. We do and must expect a major increase in the scale and effectiveness of Cuban aid and participation in revolutionary actions against other countries of Latin America now friendly to the United States. In addition to those that have already been targets - Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, recent intelligence indicates a direct interest by Castro in Colombia and Peru. Betancourt's position in Venezuela would be gravely weakened by Castro successes, and it is believed only a question of time before an alliance would be established between the powerful Communist Party of Venezuela and the Castros.

c. Rapid nationalization of the banks, industry and commerce is reportedly contemplated. If this occurs, the small group in control will have at its disposition several hundred million dollars from the sale of the sugar crop early in 1960. Part of these funds may be used to further their revolutionary objectives against other countries of the Caribbean and South America.

d. Castro has lost the support of the upper class and most of the middle class. He probably still has a sufficient following from the masses to maintain control until further inroads can be made in his popular support and the opposition more effectively unified.

e. Propaganda action to reduce his following, while essential, in itself will probably not be enough to dislodge him. His approaching stranglehold on Cuba will be broken only by violent action.

f. It is my personal opinion that if Castro is successful in consolidating his position and remaining in power for two more years,

NARA PT DATE 7-19-05

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lasting damage may occur to the United States' already weakened position of leadership in Latin America.

2. U.S. Objective.

The overthrow of Castro within one year, and his replacement by a junta friendly to the United States which will call for elections six months after assumption of office.

3. Recommended Action:

a. Clandestine radio attacks from Caribbean countries of the liberal group, working closely with us and using Cuban nationals for broadcasting.

b. Intrusion operations against Castro's TV and radio, to be mounted from within Cuba.

c. The encouragement of pro-U.S. opposition groups, excluding Batista and Masferrer supporters, to establish by force a controlled area within Cuba. This would have the following advantages:

(1) It would permit the establishment of a radio station, long wave, which would reach all of the stations in Cuba. Since it would be on Cuban soil, the problems of joint operations with other countries would be eliminated.

(2) A controlled area would be a rallying point for the growing opposition to Castro in the same manner that the 26th of July movement in the hills of Oriente became the rallying point of many who turned against Batista.

(3) It would be a means of testing the strength and fibre of the opposition, and separating the men from the boys.

(4) The reportedly large fragmented elements of the constitutional Cuban Army would have a place to go.

(5) A sizeable guerrilla movement within Cuba would curtail Castro's plans for revolutionary action against other countries.

d. Thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro. None of those close to Fidel, such as his brother Raul

-3-

or his companion Che Guevarra, have the same mesmeric appeal to the masses. Many informed people believe that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly accelerate the fall of the present Government.

*J.C. King*  
J.C. King

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

cc: DDCI

cc: CONCUR:

12 DEC 1958

*William K. Russell*  
Deputy Director (Plans)

The recommendation contained in  
paragraph 3 is approved:

*[Signature]*

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

12 DEC 1958

Appendix B

A Program of Covert Action  
Against the Castro Regime

16 Mar 60

NARA PT

DATE 7-19-05

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~

This document is our basic policy  
paper. It was approved by the  
President at a meeting in the  
White House on 17 March 1960.

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

16 March 1960

A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME

1. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention. Essentially the method of accomplishing this end will be to induce, support, and so far as possible direct action, both inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative. Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be provoked by circumstances beyond control of the U.S. before the covert action program has accomplished its objective, every effort will be made to carry it out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U.S. to act in a crisis.

2. Summary Outline: The program contemplates four major courses of action:

a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba. It is hoped that within one month a political entity can be formed in the shape of a council or junta, through the merger of three acceptable opposition groups with which the Central Intelligence Agency is already in contact. The council will be encouraged to adopt as its slogan "Restore the

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Revolution", to develop a political position consistent with that slogan, and to address itself to the Cuban people as an attractive political alternative to Castro. This vocal opposition will: serve as a magnet for the loyalties of the Cubans; in actuality conduct and direct various opposition activities; and provide cover for other compartmented CIA controlled operations. (Tab A)

b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop the means for mass communication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition. The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short wave gray broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island. The target date for its completion is two months. This will be supplemented by broadcasting from U.S. commercial facilities paid for by private Cuban groups and by the clandestine distribution of written material inside the country. (Tab B)

c. Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be responsive to the orders and directions of the "exile" opposition. Such a network must have effective communication and be selectively manned, to minimize the risk of penetration. An effective organization can probably be created within 60 days. Its role will be to provide hard

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intelligence, to arrange for the illegal infiltration and exfiltration of individuals, to assist in the internal distribution of illegal propaganda, and to plan and organize for the defection of key individuals and groups as directed.

d. Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms for the necessary logistic support of covert military operations on the Island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the U.S. so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight. In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country.

3. Leadership: It is important to avoid distracting and divisive rivalry among the outstanding Cuban opposition leaders for the senior role in the

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opposition. Accordingly, every effort will be made to have an eminent, non-ambitious, politically uncontentious chairman selected. The emergence of a successor to Castro should follow careful assessment of the various personalities active in the opposition to identify the one who can attract, control, and lead the several forces. As the possibility of an overthrow of Castro becomes more imminent, the senior leader must be selected, U.S. support focused upon him, and his build up undertaken.

4. Cover: All actions undertaken by CIA in support and on behalf of the opposition council will, of course, be explained as activities of that entity (insofar as the actions become publicly known at all). The CIA will, however, have to have direct contacts with a certain number of Cubans and, to protect these, will make use of a carefully screened group of U.S. businessmen with a stated interest in Cuban affairs and desire to support the opposition. They will act as a funding mechanism and channel for guidance and support to the directorate of the opposition under controlled conditions. CIA personnel will be documented as representatives of this group. In order to strengthen the cover it is hoped that substantial funds can be raised from private sources to support the opposition. \$100,000 has already been pledged from U.S. sources. At an appropriate time a bond issue will be floated by the council (as an obligation on a future Cuban government) to raise an additional \$2,000,000.

5. Budget: It is anticipated that approximately \$4,400,000 of CIA funds will be required for the above program. On the assumption that it will not

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reach its culmination earlier than 6 to 8 months from now, the estimated requirements for FY-1960 funds is \$900,000 with the balance of \$3,500,000 required in FY-1961. The distribution of costs between fiscal years could, of course, be greatly altered by policy decisions or unforeseen contingencies which compelled accelerated paramilitary operations. (Tab C)

6. Recommendations: That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorized to undertake the above outlined program and to withdraw the funds required for this purpose as set forth in paragraph 5. from the Agency's Reserve for contingencies.

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NARA ~~PT~~ DATE 7-19-05~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION

1. CIA is already in close touch with three reputable opposition groups (the Montecristi, Autentico Party and the National Democratic Front). These all meet the fundamental criteria conditional to acceptance, i.e. they are for the revolution as originally conceived--many being former 26th of July members--and are not identified with either Batista or Trujillo. They are anti-Castro because of his failure to live up to the original 26th of July platform and his apparent willingness to sell out to Communist domination and possible ultimate enslavement. These groups, therefore, fit perfectly the planned opposition slogan of "Restore the Revolution".

2. An opposition Council or Junta will be formed within 30 days from representatives of these groups augmented possibly by representatives of other groups. It is probably premature to have a fixed platform for the Council but the Caracas Manifesto of 20 July 1958 contains a number of exploitable points. Two of the CIA group leaders were signers of the Manifesto. The following points are suggested as a few possibilities:

a. The Castro regime is the new dictatorship of Cuba subject to strong Sino-Soviet influence.

b. Cuba is entitled to an honest, democratic government based on free elections. There is no hope of this as long as Castro throttles the rights of legitimate political parties and the freedom of expression.

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2

c. A realistic agrarian reform program providing for individual ownership of the land must be put into effect.

d. Individual freedoms must be restored and collectivism in commerce and education must be eliminated.

e. Sino-Soviet influence in the affairs of Cuba must be eliminated.

A special research group of Cubans with American support is planned to refine and expand these planks and to produce propaganda materials based on the above platform for use by and on behalf of the opposition Council.

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Tab B

~~EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET~~PROPAGANDA

1. Articulation and transmission of opposition views has already begun. Private opposition broadcasts (i. e. purchase of commercial time by private individuals) have occurred in Miami (medium wave) and arrangements have been made with Station WRUL for additional broadcasts from Massachusetts (short wave) and Florida (broadcast band). [ 6 ] and [ 76 ] have also agreed to the use of commercial stations for short wave broadcasts from [ 10 ] and [ 10 ]. CIA has furnished support to these efforts through encouragement, negotiating help and providing some broadcast material.

2. As the major voice of the opposition, it is proposed to establish at least one "gray" U.S. -controlled station. This will probably be on Swan Island and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial power. The preparation of scripts will be done in the U.S. and these will be transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting. After some experience and as the operation progresses, it may be desirable to supplement the Swan Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all parts of Cuba, most especially the Havana region. Such an additional facility might be installed on a U.S. base in the Bahamas or temporary use might be made of a shipborne station if it is desired to avoid "gray" broadcasting from Florida.

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3. Newspapers are also being supported and further support is planned for the future. Avance, a leading Cuban daily (Zayas' paper), has been confiscated as has El Mundo, another Cuban daily. Diario de la Marina, one of the hemisphere's outstanding conservative dailies published in Havana, is having difficulty and may have to close soon. Arrangements have already been made to print Avance weekly in the U.S. for introduction into Cuba clandestinely and mailing throughout the hemisphere on a regular basis. As other leading newspapers are expropriated, publication of "exile" editions will be considered.

4. Inside Cuba, a CIA-controlled action group is producing and distributing anti-Castro and anti-Communist publications regularly. CIA is in contact with groups outside Cuba who will be assisted in producing similar materials for clandestine introduction into Cuba.

5. Two prominent Cubans are on lecture tours in Latin America. They will be followed by others of equal calibre. The mission of these men will be to gain hemisphere support for the opposition to Castro. Controlled Western Hemisphere assets (press, radio, television) will support this mission as will selected American journalists who will be briefed prior to Latin American travel.

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Tab. C

FINANCIAL ANNEX

I. <u>Political Action</u>	<u>FY-1960</u>	<u>FY-1961</u>
Support of Opposition Elements and other Group Activities	150,000	800,000
II. <u>Propaganda</u>		
Radio Operations and Programming (including establishment of trans- mitters)	400,000	700,000
Press and Publications	100,000	500,000
III. <u>Paramilitary</u>		
In-Exfiltration Maritime and Air Support Material and Training	200,000	1,300,000
IV. <u>Intelligence Collection</u>	50,000	200,000
Totals	* 900,000	3,500,000

\*These figures are based on the assumption that major action will not occur until FY-1961. If by reason of policy decisions or other contingencies over which the Agency cannot exercise control, the action program should be accelerated, additional funds will be required.

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Appendix C-1

CNO Correspondence with Department of State

and NSC:

- 1) Letter for Allen Dulles  
from Arleigh Burke,  
17 Mar 60

☒ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ☐ CONFID

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Ltr from Admiral Burke

FROM:

DD/P

In March 1960

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. C/WH Division			gck	1. Admiral Burke sent this over to the Director on the afternoon of 17 March and the latter handed to me. I do not believe it requires a reply but pass it to you for any value it may have.  RMBjr.
2.				
3.				
4. C/WH/4				
5. [ 3 ] Hand Carry				
6. [ 3 ] Hand Carry				
7.				
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10. CWH Cuba File				



CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

17 March 1960

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PERSONAL - TOP ~~SECRET~~

Dear Allen:

Enclosed is a memorandum my staff prepared containing some suggestions which might be useful to you in your work. Naturally, I do not agree with quite all the comments contained in the memorandum, but I know that you will forgive the impatient young lad for his desire to make sure no opportunity is left uncovered.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,

ARLEIGH BURKE

The Honorable  
Allen Dulles  
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

PERSONAL - TOP ~~SECRET~~

Appendix C-2

CNO Correspondence with Department of State  
and NSC:

- 2) Letter for Gordon Gray from  
Arleigh Burke, 16 Mar 60

~~TOP SECRET~~ CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

~~TOP SECRET~~

16 March 1960

Dear Gordon:

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum on U.S. action in Cuba which may be of interest to you.

Sincerely yours,

*Arleigh*  
ARLEIGH BURKE

The Honorable  
Gordon Gray  
Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House

Enclosure

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68-62

07-603D/3-11  
 16 Mar 1960

Via: 07-603D  
 07-603

U. S. Action in Cuba (3)

1. The recommendations contained in the paper on "U.S. Actions in Cuba" were intended originally to provide the broad outline for a carefully laid out program for causing the Castro regime to be replaced by a friendly government. It was intended that State would logically control and coordinate all aspects and provide the guidance as to the specific actions required of the other departments of the government. The paper was not interpreted in this manner by those who received it and the search appears now to be for specific actions which can be used to accomplish the end desired.

2. The following are offered as possible specific actions which can be taken in support of our position on Cuba - You might desire to have OO inject these items into the NSC meeting, 16 March.

a. IACB - Chairman, or the Chief of the U.S. Delegation, attempt to have a delegation other than U.S. introduce a motion for the Board to consider the gap in hemispheric defense resulting from the Cuban situation or for the Board to recommend that the OAS study the influence of Communism in Cuba.

b. Commercial - Oil companies are not being paid by Cuba. State could request the oil companies to point out to the governments who produce the oil the effects on their economies of the loss of the Cuban market.

c. Schools and War Colleges - The Services could include in courses for foreign officers the effect on hemisphere defense of the establishment of a Communist dictatorship in Cuba.

d. Commercial - Do Latin Americans hold stock in the expropriated properties in Cuba? If so, State could request the companies concerned to include in their dividend mailings, information pointing out the effect on the companies' earnings and the stockholders' dividends of expropriation of property without compensation and, for the oil companies, non-payment for oil delivered.

e. State, in conjunction with CIA, publish a weekly or bi-weekly letter documenting the actions of the Castro Government for the previous period. Included would be:

- (1) Violations of human rights.
- (2) Communist trends and actions.
- (3) Dictatorial and undemocratic actions.



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Distribute this to:

- (1) All U.S. diplomatic posts.
- (2) Army, Navy and Air Force for further distribution to units or officers in contact with Latin Americans.

For use as talking points to:

- (1) Discredit the Castro regime.
- (2) Build support for the U.S. position.
- (3) Alert Latin Americans as to the Communist aspects.

f. All Services - Prepare and distribute speech material suitable for inclusion in various types of addresses. Material should cover:

- (1) Communist aspects of present Cuban Government.
- (2) Threat of Communism in Cuba to hemispheric defense.
- (3) The dictatorial aspects of the Cuban regime.
- (4) The Cuban regime's actions against the basic human rights.
- (5) The strategic importance of the Guantanamo Naval Base.
- (6) The logic of the firmness of the treaties by which we hold Guantanamo and the formal commitment of the Castro regime on taking power to honor Cuba's international commitments.

Distribute this material to the Services and to their Leagues and Associations for maximum use in public speeches.

g. IADB - Have General Shner, as Director of the Staff, IADB, inject into the monthly intelligence briefings at the IADB information on the latest Soviet Bloc actions and the progress of International Communism in Cuba.

h. State, in conjunction with CIA and the Service intelligence agencies, hold special briefings once each month on the general situation in Cuba with special emphasis on the Communist aspects for the following:

- (1) U. S. officials of the OAS and UN.
- (2) U.S. personnel of the Staff of the IADB.
- (3) Official U.S. personnel in Washington having duties involving close contact with Latin Americans.

i. All Services provide special briefings on a one-time basis along the line of A. above for officers and enlisted personnel of units proceeding to Caribbean or South American ports.

j. Navy endeavor to have a good reporter or author prepare a story containing the Navy's views on Guantanamo for publication in a national magazine with wide circulation in Latin America.

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k. May - Accept Mr. Merchant's offer in his letter of March 10 to Admiral ~~Smith~~ on a complete briefing of State Department activities vis a vis the Cuban situation in an effort to prod State to move faster.

1. State - Brief all individuals and groups of U.S. Nationals going to Latin America on the Communist threat in Cuba for further dissemination to host country personnel.

Very respectfully,

J. E. POND, JR.

Appendix C-3

CNO Correspondence with Department of State

and NSC:

- 3) Memorandum for the Special  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
from Haydn Williams, 16 Mar 60,  
sub: US Policy toward Cuba



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MAR 16 1960

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy toward Cuba

Enclosed is an exchange of letters on the above subject between Admiral Burke and Under Secretary Merchant, both of whom have authorized that I make the correspondence available to you for whatever help it may be in connection with the discussion of this subject at the Council meeting this coming Thursday.

*Hayden Williamson*  
Deputy Assistant Secretary

2 Encls  
A/s

33 000 000

10 Mar 60

Dear Arleigh:

I was much interested in your personal letter of February 26, 1960, on Cuba and the Caribbean situation, in which I noted a marked degree of similarity in the suggestions of the Navy and of our people here concerning the need to reverse the trend in Cuba and the methods which are best calculated to achieve this result.

As you are doubtless aware from the briefing which Dick Robertson and I gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 8, 1960, most of the courses of action suggested in the memorandum headed "Recommendations for U. S. Actions in Cuba," which you transmitted with your letter, were initiated some time ago and are constantly being intensified. To recapitulate, our own thinking on the Cuban situation as it relates to Communism and our own security interests has been as follows:

a. The maximum objective of International Communism-- in the immediate future--is the consolidation of a radical, anti-American Revolution friendly to the USSR in Cuba and the utilization of Cuba as a base to promote similar revolutionary movements in the Caribbean. The minimum objective of the Communists, if they are unable to achieve the foregoing, is to make the United States pay as high price as possible for the elimination of the undesirable features of the Cuban Revolution. In particular, the Communists stand to gain by provoking us into armed intervention, or otherwise taking interventionist actions in violation of our commitments in a manner which could be made to appear as if the United States reacted the same way as the Soviets did in Hungary and other satellites.

b. Unless

Admiral Arleigh Burke,  
Chief of Naval Operations,  
Department of the Navy.

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b. Unless we were indefinitely to occupy Cuba militarily, the only solution to the Cuban problem is necessarily the emergence of a Cuban leadership willing to and capable of governing the country along lines acceptable to the Cuban people and along lines consistent with basic U. S. policy with respect to Latin America. This will take time. On the one hand, it is doubtful that any Cuban Government which resulted from U. S. armed or other overt intervention could long survive our withdrawal. On the other, despite our on long-standing misgivings concerning Castro, it is an incontrovertible fact that he came into power with overwhelming support not only in Cuba but elsewhere in the hemisphere, including in this country. Although that support has largely evaporated in the United States—and, to a lesser extent, in responsible circles in the other Latin American Republics—Castro and, particularly, his reform program still enjoy very considerable support in his country. Cubans, even those disillusioned with Castro, have yet to find an alternative leadership which they believe would actually carry out the reform program which public opinion still demands. Opposition elements tainted with collaboration with the Batista regime are still politically unacceptable and could not establish a stable government. Opposition groups that might be acceptable to Cubans are beginning to organize more effectively but, at best, it will be months before they are ready for vigorous action.

c. The primary objective of U. S. policy should be the escalation of the creation of an effective, patriotic movement friendly to the United States within Cuba and among Cuban exiles to counter Cuba's current trend. The first task is to assure, insofar as we are able to do so, a climate in which responsible and friendly Cubans would find it worthwhile to oppose Castro policies which harm the Committee and undermine good U.S.-Cuban relations. On the positive side, we should and are taking actions and making statements which would encourage such elements to organize more effectively and to expect per support and collaboration in their efforts to achieve political and economic progress for Cuba by taking a different road than the present Cuban regime's. At the JCS briefing, we gave an indication of the covert activities underway towards this end, as well as an indication of the extensive unattributed effort which has been underway for over a year to identify and expose to public opinion throughout the hemisphere the Communist aspects of the Cuban problem. On the negative side, our policies are guided by the principle that opposition to Castro's policies in Cuba will

increase

-3-

increase fairly rapidly, if it is clear to Cubans that Castro himself is responsible for political and economic deterioration of the country. However, the consolidation of the opposition will be slowed down if Castro can succeed by wrapping the flag of patriotism and nationalism about himself in further convincing the Cuban people that the United States has aggressive designs on the Cuban nation as a whole and that the United States rather than Castro's policies is responsible for Cuba's difficulties. We must, therefore, exercise the greatest care that we do not unconsciously transform the developing dissatisfaction of the Cuban people with Castro into a fight between the United States and Cuba, for no self-respecting Cuban could then afford to support us against his own country.

d. While we believe that inter-American action through the OAS and/or some economic action by the United States in defense of its rights may play an important role at the proper time, we must not let these possibilities cause us to lose sight of the critical fact that no solution will be possible until an alternative leadership is ready to move in. If the application of collective or unilateral procedures should bring the Castro Government down before an acceptable leadership is ready to take over, the probabilities are civil war or a take-over by even more Communist elements. Either would bring us closer to armed intervention. Thus, while we are going ahead in the process of influencing the other American Republics to see the Communist and other aspects of the Cuban situation as we do and preparing the ground for possible inter-American consideration of the Cuban problem, we intend to control the timing of any such action insofar as possible to coincide with the development of an alternative leadership. It is also the intention of the Administration to propose to the Congress that the President be given discretionary authority to alter or suspend quotas in the national interest and we have developed and are putting into effect an action plan to obtain the release of the United States from certain other economic commitments which impair our ability to take action in the economic field when this could contribute to safeguarding our interest or to the creation of conditions favorable to a leadership opposed to Castro's policies.

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With respect to all these matters, a most important element is time. Time is needed for Cuba to realize that the deterioration of their political and economic life is due to Castro's actions, including his connections with International Communism. Time is needed for an alternative leadership to emerge and to organize effectively for action. Time is also needed further to enable Latin American opinion to take the measure of the situation and for Latin American Governments to come around more to the point of view that the Cuban situation is a matter of common concern, not just a U.S.-Castro quarrel. We are using all available facilities to make this time as short as possible, but our experience in other difficult situations in the Near East and Central America indicate that immediate results are not to be expected. Meanwhile, we are going to have, we believe, to exercise restraint from taking actions which, while reflecting our own great sense of concern and urgency, would actually retard the process of change which we all desire.

I should point out also that, while action in the OAS at the right time may be desirable as a means of encouraging an alternative Cuban leadership, we would probably have to contend with Soviets in the United Nations. It is almost certain that the Cubans will try to anticipate or counter any U. S. approach to the OAS by going directly to the United Nations. Furthermore, actual "enforcement action" by the OAS would probably be brought up before the United Nations under Article 53 of the UN Charter even if we argued that any action taken by the OAS constituted only "recommendations" to governments. This reinforces our view that action in the OAS—which can be taken under the Charter by consulting a meeting of Foreign Ministers, as well as under the Rio Treaty and the Caracas Resolution—should primarily be viewed as a means of strengthening Cuban opposition to Castro's policies at the right moment rather than as a means of quarantining Cuba and waiting to see what happens. It would at present be somewhat difficult to bring a case against Cuba under the Caracas Resolution since the latest Special National Intelligence Estimate—which we have asked to be reviewed—does not find the Cuban Government to be Communist-dominated at present. If our own Estimate does not yet substantiate the case, it would be difficult in a short time to persuade less well-informed governments that "the political institutions" of Cuba are under International Communist control or domination.

As you are aware, our basic national policy (NSC 5902/1) views armed intervention as a last resort to be approved by the President when all else fails. We would be most reluctant to make or counter in such recommendation to the President until there had been a reasonable chance for all other solutions to be tested.

Thank you.



NARA PTDATE 7-19-05~~SECRET~~

25

Thank you again for sending me a copy of your memorandum. As you know, the NSC is keeping the Cuban problem under constant scrutiny, having discussed it in some detail at its January 14 meeting and again this morning. At the first of the meetings, the Secretary of State reviewed the policy toward Cuba which had been approved by the President, and the consensus of this morning's meeting was that this policy is essentially correct. We anticipate that, at future meetings of the NSC, there will be further discussions concerning Cuba to determine whether there should be a modification of policy toward that country. In view of the fact that today's NSC meeting indicated continued agreement on the validity of the policy discussed in January, it would appear unnecessary to develop new policy documentation at this time, especially as the proposals in your Early memorandum closely parallel policies which are already underway. Should you, or your colleagues on the Joint Chiefs, desire a further briefing on our actions and operational plans to carry out the policy, I should be more than glad to arrange it.

Sincerely,

Livingston T. Harshbarger  
Under Secretary for Political Affairs

//

~~SECRET~~

26 FEB 1963

~~SECRET~~

SECRET - PERSONAL

Dear Livie:

I am becoming increasingly concerned over deteriorating conditions in the Caribbean. I am especially concerned over the present situation in Cuba, in whose security the Navy is directly interested by reason of this island's strategic location with respect to the sea approaches to the southern United States and the Panama Canal, and because of the location there of the Guantanamo Naval Base. Cuba appears to be in the process of falling under the domination of International Communism. Should this trend continue unchecked and a communist dominated or "front government" become a reality, a direct threat to the security of the United States would be presented. Additionally, a communist controlled state in Cuba would serve as a base of operations for the further spread of communistic influence in the Western Hemisphere having as its aim the isolation of the United States from Latin America.

Because of my concern, I am taking the liberty of sending you the attached paper as indicative of current Navy thinking in this matter, - namely that positive action to reverse the present trend should be initiated to the end that the communist threat is eliminated and a stable, friendly government established in Cuba. Action taken now in the case of Cuba will also facilitate and provide a foundation for any similar actions which may be necessary to prevent the spread of communism in Latin America and to stabilize other areas where unrest is appearing.

I am also sending a copy of this letter and the enclosure to Jack Irwin.

Sincerely,

ARLISH BURNS

The Honorable Livingston T. Merchant  
 New State Department Building  
 Washington 25, D. C.

Enclosure: Paper on U.S. Action in Cuba

Copy to: Mr. J. M. Irwin II, (OSD/ISA) w/enclosure

NARA PT DATE 7-19-05MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. ACTION IN CUBAINTRODUCTION

1. The Castro Movement in Cuba is a vehicle by which international communism appears to be gaining a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. If the present trend continues, it will soon be too late for the United States to stem the Soviet incursion into this hemisphere. This situation, in its many ramifications, presents an immediate threat to the security of the United States and to that of our important neighbors in North and South America.

ISSUES

2. What action can be taken to prevent the establishment of a communist state in Cuba and to restore a stable, friendly government?

BACKGROUND

3. The U. S. has never renounced the Monroe Doctrine. This was reaffirmed by Secretary of State Dulles in his address to the Nation on July 12, 1954, on International Communism in Guatemala. In that address, Mr. Dulles stated:

"For several years international communism has been probing here and there for resting places in the Americas. It finally chose Guatemala as a spot which it could turn into an official base from which to breed subversion which would extend to other American Republics."

"This intrusion of Soviet despotism was, of course, a direct challenge to our Monroe Doctrine, the first and most fundamental of our foreign policies."

The United States is bound by treaties which commit it to seek settlement of hemispheric disputes by peaceful means, but which also provide for action in the event of aggression either from outside the hemisphere or within. Article 5 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro, 1947, requires each contracting party to send to the Security Council of the UN complete information "concerning the activities undertaken... for the purpose of maintaining Inter-American peace and security."

Article 6 of this treaty states:

"If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack ... or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in

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order to agree on ... the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent."

The Declaration adopted by the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas, Venezuela, March 1954, states:

"That the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement, extending to this hemisphere the political system of an extra-continental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for the meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties."

The 26th of July Movement succeeded in displacing Batista on 1 Jan 1959. Since that time the Castro regime has followed increasingly the classic strategy for establishing a communist state. The communist time table is delineated in American Embassy Havana Dispatch no. 903 dated 29 December 1959. The ruthless elimination of the opposition, assumption of dictatorial powers, suspension of elections, the "Late America" campaign, the studied breakdown of the economy and confiscation of property, the initiation of relations and trade with the Soviet Union, the forbidding of anti-communist activity and the breakdown and reconstitution of the Armed Services and police are all typical communist maneuvers.

The majority of the Cubans are not yet committed to the acceptance of communism nor are they aware of the trend of the Revolution in this direction. The lower classes, however, continue to give full support to Castro and the Revolution.

It has not yet been proved that Castro himself is a communist. However, some of his principal deputies as well as other leaders are believed to be communists. In any case, individuals susceptible to communist influence are occupying key positions in the government as well as in all important organizations and trade unions. Two developments are noticeable. Communists are being appointed openly and are being elected (in trade unions) to key positions. Hidden communists in the 26th of July Movement are taking positions in seeming opposition to the open communists.

At present the Cuban Armed Forces are disorganized and apparently capable only of guerrilla warfare. Intelligence reports indicate that the Soviet Bloc may be supplying technicians to assist in training the new forces and supplying arms to the new government. There is no present indication that the fall of the Castro Government is imminent. If it should fall, however, the government would most probably emerge as a communist government because

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~~S. C. 1~~

opposition leaders have been eliminated and there appear to be no leaders of stature remaining around whom anti-Castro/anti-Communist peoples could rally. Should Castro fall or be assassinated, mob action which would probably result would jeopardize the safety of Americans in Cuba. Finally, in the worst extreme, the possibility of direct support for Cuba by the Soviet bloc, even to the extent of an open mutual security agreement, cannot be disregarded.

#### DISCUSSION

4. Three basic courses of action are open to the U. S.

- A. Multilateral action through the OAS.
- B. Unilateral Overt Action by the U. S.
- C. Covert Unilateral Action by the U.S.

All subsidiary actions, such as economic pressure and moral sanction, which will assist in achieving the objective should also be taken in addition to the above.

#### A. MULTILATERAL ACTION THROUGH THE OAS.

The machinery exists in the declaration and agreements of the OAS for the U. S. to request convocation of the Organ of Consultation of the OAS with subsequent investigation of the government in Cuba, and, if approval of the member states is obtained, intervention to prevent a Communist take-over.

##### (1) Advantages:

(a) It would be in consonance with our national policy and our treaty commitments under the OAS.

(b) It would strengthen the OAS and would reassure the Free World and the Latin American States of U. S. willingness to live up to commitments.

##### (2) Disadvantages:

(a) Uncertainty of support for OAS action by other Latin American States.

(b) Delay in OAS action could result in a Communist controlled front government being a "fait accompli" in Cuba.

(c) Could result in the entire problem ending in the Security

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Council of the UN where the Soviet Union has a veto.

B. UNILATURAL COERCIVE ACTION BY THE U.S.

The U. S. has the capability to seize Cuba by direct military action, and after a consolidation period, cause the establishment of a friendly, non-communist government.

(1) Advantages:

(a) It would be in consonance with the Monroe Doctrine, which is still basic U. S. policy with respect to the Western Hemisphere, and would solve the problem.

(b) It would serve notice to the world that the U. S. will not tolerate the establishment of a communist or ~~communist~~ "front" regime in the Western Hemisphere.

(c) It would re-emphasize to the world that the U. S. will not hesitate to act when its security is at stake.

(d) It would dispel any illusions by the world at large that the U. S. is unwilling, and unable to act no matter what the provocation. It would also probably stop the "baiting of the U.S." in which some minor powers throughout the world indulge.

(2) Disadvantages:

(a) It would violate our OAS commitments to seek settlement by peaceful means.

(b) It would lead to charges of aggression against the U.S., both in the OAS and in the United Nations, with the resulting possibility of UN and OAS action against the U. S.

(c) It would prove that the U.S. is not willing to abide by its treaties if U. S. interests dictate otherwise.

(d) It could isolate the U.S. from the other American States.

(e) It would violate the principle of non-intervention.

C. COERCIVE UNILATURAL ACTION BY THE U.S.

The U. S. could assist rebel groups covertly to overthrow the present government and re-establish a friendly government. Concurrently, it could take all possible measures to alert all friendly nations and the U.S. people and branches of the U. S. Government to the danger of the threat

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in order to discredit Cuba and bring world opinion to the side of the U.S.

(1) Advantages:

(a) U. S. would not be charged with aggression.

(b) If carried out successfully, Free World and Latin American opinion would be favorable to the U. S.

(2) Disadvantages:

(a) There is no certainty of success.

(b) The effort might well come too late.

In considering and comparing the above courses of action, the basic assumption that the United States cannot and must not permit within the Western Hemisphere the establishment of any government dominated by the International Communists is paramount. Therefore, if other courses of action fail, the U. S. must, even in the face of adverse world opinion, take unilateral action to prevent such an occurrence.

Until the situation reaches the stage where direct unilateral action by the U.S. is the only course left, it appears that a combination of those parts of courses of action A and C which have a fair chance of success should be followed in order to utilize the prime advantage given under A, i.e., the cooperation and good will of the other American States.

CONCLUSIONS

5. The following conclusions are reached:

a. The establishment of a communist government, or a "front" government following communist precepts, in Cuba would be a direct threat to the security of the U. S. and would endanger hemispheric security.

b. The U. S. should initiate positive action to eliminate the threat before a communist or "front" government in Cuba is a "fait accompli."

c. Although the revolution still has the support of the masses, the resulting government in Cuba is following the path of international communism. Although they are not yet aware of the trend toward communism, Castro has the personal loyalty of the masses.

d. American holdings are being confiscated. American lives may be endangered if stable, responsible government is not ensured.

e. The Monroe Doctrine is still basic U. S. policy with respect to the Western Hemisphere.

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2. Procedure exists under the Declaration of Caracas to request action by the OAS against a Communist threat to hemispheric security.

3. The U. S. should proceed to document the extent of infiltration of communists into key positions in Cuba and the extent of extra-Western hemisphere communist support of the present Cuban regime.

4. The U. S. should initiate a campaign to apprise all U. S. agencies, the U. S. public, and the other American States of the threat in order to gain support for any future action that may be taken.

1. The U. S. should actively support the Cuban opposition.

5. The U. S., after having gained the required support, should present its case before the OAS in order that joint action by the members of the OAS may be taken to eliminate the communist threat and establish a friendly, stable government in Cuba.

6. The U. S., as a last resort, should take unilateral military action to eliminate the threat.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

6. To accomplish the above, the following plan of action is recommended:

a. Immediately document the communist time table and the communist take-over in Cuba.

b. Use all resources and media to make the U.S. and the other American States aware of the threat. The following should be utilized to accomplish this:

(1) Intelligence briefings of:

(a) U. S. Government officials.

(b) Newspaper representatives and editors.

(c) U.S. businessmen operating abroad and going abroad.

(d) The LANS members and Latin American diplomatic personnel and military attaches.

(e) The Catholic Church (possibly through the Apostolic Delegate).

(f) Church groups operating in Latin America.

(g) Latin American officials visiting the U. S. and U. S. installations.



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(2) Orientation of radio broadcasts and news reports, both government and private.

(3) The U. S. Information Service.

(4) All country teams.

c. Covertly support the Cuban opposition. Select and groom trusted Cubans as appropriate to assume responsible posts in a friendly government.

d. Be prepared to use force to safeguard and evacuate U. S. Nationals should the situation deteriorate to the point where they are endangered.

e. When support has been gained, request, in conjunction with other members of the OAS, convenion of the Organ of Consultation of the OAS under the Terms of the Declaration of Caracas to:

(1) Seek OAS action to call on Cuba to place herself under OAS auspices "in order to preserve the revolution for the people and prevent communist take-over," and;

(2) Seek OAS action to intervene by force in the event the above fails, and;

(3) In whatever joint group is formed to accomplish the above, keep U. S. participation to a minimum in order to force the Latin American States to assume their responsibilities to the Hemisphere and to counter accusations of U. S. imperialism.

f. In the event time does not permit completion of the above, or as a last resort, be prepared to take unilateral military action to establish a non-communist government in Cuba.



~~SECRET~~

Appendix D

Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) -

Action from J. D. Esterline, 2 May 60

NARA PT DATE 7-19-05~~EYES ONLY~~~~SECRET~~

COPY

2 May 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) - Action

SUBJECT : Liaison with United States' Agencies on JMARC Activities

1. This memorandum contains information for the Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) - Action.
2. The attached chart on liaison with other agencies of the United States' Government on JMARC activities is restricted to those contacts that are made on a regular basis, such as the weekly policy meeting with the Department of State, and to offices which, we must contact quite frequently to solicit their support, such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
3. As you know, infrequent contacts are made at various other levels of the Executive Branch including:
  - a. Brigadier General Cushman, Vice President Nixon's military assistant.
  - b. NSC 5412 Representatives.
  - c. Certain United States' Senators and Representatives, particularly Senator George Smathers of Florida.
4. In the early stages of JMARC we had almost daily contact with Rear Admiral S. B. Renkin, USN, who was the action officer on the movement of two radio transmitters and construction of the broadcasting facility on Swan Island.
5. Through Raymond Millard [Mallard?], the Agency is in close touch with CINCLANT at Norfolk. Robert Reynolds, Deputy Chief, WH/4, has briefed selected senior officers on JMARC 4. Mr. Reynolds is the designated CIA alternate for the CINCLANT force under provisions of the Contingency Operations Plan for Cuba.

J. D. ESTERLINE  
Chief, WH/4

Attachment:

Chart mentioned in paragraph 2.

~~SECRET~~~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~EYES ONLY~~

COPY

OFFICE

NATURE OF DISCUSSION

CIA REPRESENTATIVE

FREQUENCY

STATE DEPARTMENT

Office Inter-American Affairs (ARA)  
(Mr. Rubottom)

Policy

Col. J. C. King

Weekly

Cuba Working Group (State, USIA)  
(Chaired by Ambassador Mallory)

Overt Programs

[ 3 ]

Daily

Consular & Security Affairs  
(Mr. John Haynes)

Passports for Aliens

Mr. Pennington (OS)

As required

Office of Intelligence & Research  
(Ambassador J. Lampton Berry)

"Talent" Matters

E. A. Stanulis

As required

Inter-departmental Defector Committee

Cuban "Defectors"

[ 3 ]

As required

Latin America Task Force  
(Chaired by John Hill (ARA))

Program Coordination

Paul E. Oberst

Weekly

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

Office of Special Operations  
(Capt. Burns B. Spore, USN)

Defense Support

E. A. Stanulis  
Robert Young (CC)

As required

Office of Special Operations  
(Capt. Burns B. Spore, USN)

Briefing

J. D. Esterline

Weekly

Collateral Support Section,  
Office of Naval Intelligence  
(Cdr. Frank Day, USN)

Cover

Robert Young (CC)

As Required

Operations Branch, Collection  
Division, ACSI (Army)  
(Col. Stewart McKinney)

Cover

Robert Young (CC)

As required

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~~EYES ONLY~~

Continued

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~~EYES ONLY~~

OFFICE

NATURE OF DISCUSSION

CIA REPRESENTATIVE FREQUENCY

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

Director, Voice of America  
(Henry Loomis)

Coordination

David A. Phillips Weekly

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

Office of the Director  
(Mr. Hennessey)

U. S. Entry of Cubans

Mr. Pennington (OS) As required

~~SECRET~~  
~~EYES ONLY~~

RELEASED PER P.L. 102-526 (JFK ACU)  
NARA PT DATE 7-17-95  
53

NARA PT DATE 7-19-05

## Appendix E

Attack on Petroleum Refinery at

Santiago de Cuba

13-14 March 1961

MAR 61

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RRIM

BELL 15

O/P, COO, ADDP/A, WH 3, OC 6, BELL T/C

ROUTING	
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2	5
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MAR 14 0920Z 61

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 3307

Best Copy I could get!

M. BELL KOLA WAVE CITE RIME 3307

IP TAGBAR COMMO

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM BARBARA AT 146638Z NR4 146600Z

BT

10. RE YOUR MSG NUMBER 49. CADICK SENDS.  
RE TEACUP DEPARTED 130015R MARCH. SNEAKED PAST SEVERAL  
ONES TO CAYO RATON. ISLAND COVERED WITH BRUSH AND TREES.  
FIELD FIRE TO REFINERY WITHOUT DISTURBING OCCUPANTS TWO  
BESS MOVED TO MAINLAND NEAR REFINERY ENCOUNTERING STORM  
RET BACKED OUT IN WATER TO 250 YARDS FROM REFINERY FOR CLEAN  
FIRE. FIRED 7 TYPE 81MM WATER SHOTS WITH FIVE HITS IN  
TOWER AND ONE TOWER STARTING ON FIRE. FIRED 200 ROUNDS  
ALICE HIT TWO CRACKING PLANT AND CAUSING BRIGHT EXPLOSION  
EST TOWER. TOWER CHARGE BLEW ON DEPARTURE. VIEW TOWER  
ED BY REET TEACUP HUGGING BEACH ON WAY OUT BUT REFINERY  
DAMAGED AND TOWER LIGHTS DISAPPEARED. SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS  
FREQUENTLY HEARD BY TEACUP. CONSISTED OF SMALL ARMS  
SOUND REPEATEDLY AND HEARD IN TOWER. DANGERED REFINERY  
REFINERY IN FLAME. REET 3 RIGGZ RETURNED. REET 3 RIGGZ  
REETAL MANSION FIRING AND WAS DROPPED INTO WATER. MOTORS ON

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE R 3343

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2

AT QUIT OUT RESTARTED IN FEW MINUTES. AT HARBOR ENTRANCE AT  
AST 500 CALIBRES AND 120 MILLIMETER ENGAGED US PLUS PLenty SMALL

70 AND ONE STRONG SEARCHLIGHT. LEFT SEARCHLIGHT POINTING  
DOWN INTO WATER AND SILENCED 20 MILLIMETER BUT 50'S FOLLOWED  
ACUP OUT TO SEA WHERE BARBARA J MADE FINE PICK UP RIGHT ON  
ACTION. DE COMPLETED AT 130400R.

[Team screwed up?  
See Para 1]

2. AT NO TIME DID TEACUP FIRE AT ANY EXCEPT THOSE OBVIOUSLY  
AIMING ABOUT PREVENTING TEACUPS DEPARTURE.

3. TEACUP COOLEST SEEN BY CADICK TO DATE. SUGGEST FOUR OF  
THE LEADER MATERIAL AND HQS COULD USE THEM IN PRE-INVASION  
OPERATIONS MINUS ONE IF FOUR TEAMS ORGANIZED AROUND THEM.

END OF MESSAGE



Appendix F

Richard M. Nixon's Memorandum  
on Meeting with Fidel Castro,  
19 April 1959

1458 - 1460

7/26/60 269

24:1

# The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited

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B	1459	X	347	348	349	350	351	352	353	354	355	356	357	358
C	359	360	361	362	363	364	365	366	367	368	369	370	371	372
D	373	374	375	376	377	378	379	380	381	382	383	384	385	386
E	387	388	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
F	1460	X	1960 1964	2000 2004	2005	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
G	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	X	

REEL #

C#

DATE

# **The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited: An International Collection of Documents, from the Bay of Pigs to the Brink of Nuclear War**

Published by: ProQuest Information and Learning, 300 North Zeeb Rd., PO Box 1346, Ann Arbor, MI 48106, USA

*The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited: An International Collection of Documents, from the Bay of Pigs to the Brink of Nuclear War* reproduces a comprehensive collection of records from the archives of the three key governments involved in the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold war. Declassified records from the United States, Russia and Cuba significantly advance analysis of the historical foundations of the missile crisis, the policy calculations and considerations of President John F. Kennedy and premiers Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro, and the overt and covert military and paramilitary operations that combined to bring the world to the threshold of a nuclear exchange. Topics extensively covered in the documentation include the failed U.S.-led invasion at the Bay of Pigs, renewed attempts to overthrow Castro through Operation Mongoose and Operation Northwoods, U.S. military contingency planning for conflict with Cuba, naval warfare, Soviet and Cuban decision making and communications during the crisis, and the repercussions for U.S.-Soviet relations, and Soviet-Cuban relations in its aftermath. Materials were identified, obtained, assembled and indexed by the National Security Archive, a non-profit Washington D.C. based research institute and library. The microfiche collection is accompanied by a printed guide and index.

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

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RICHARD NIXON

LA CASA PACIFICA  
SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA

July 27, 1979

*Dear Dr. Pfeiffer,*

I am enclosing a copy of the summary  
of my conversation with Fidel Castro  
in 1959, as you requested in your  
letter of July 19th.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

*Richard Nixon*

Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer  
CIA Historian  
Washington, D.C. 20505

enclosure, 4 pages

COPY

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COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 19, 1959

Summary of conversation between The Vice President and Fidel Castro:

When Castro arrived for the conference he seemed somewhat nervous and tense. He apparently felt that he had not done as well on "Meet the Press" as he had hoped. He was particularly concerned about whether he might have irritated Senator Smathers for the comments he made with regard to him. I reassured him at the beginning of the conversation that "Meet the Press" was one of the most difficult programs a public official could go on and that he had done extremely well -- particularly having in mind the fact that he had the courage to go on in English rather than to speak through a translator.

The subjects we discussed were no different from those on which he had made public statements on several other occasions. A brief summary, however, might be of interest, particularly in view of the comments I made with regard to the positions he took.

I suggested at the outset that while I understood some reasonable time might elapse before it would be feasible to have elections it would nevertheless be much better from his viewpoint if he were not to state so categorically that it would be as long as four years before elections would be held. I urged him to state his position as being in favor of having elections at the earliest possible date and that four years would be the maximum amount of time that would elapse before elections were scheduled. He went into considerable detail as he had in public with regard to the reasons for not holding elections, emphasizing particularly that "the people did not want elections because the elections in the past had produced bad government."

He used the same argument that he was simply reflecting the will of the people in justifying the executions of war criminals and his overruling the acquittal of Batista's aviators. In fact he seemed to be obsessed with the idea that it was his responsibility to carry out the will of the people

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-2-

whatever it might appear to be at a particular time. It was also apparent that as far as his visit to the United States was concerned his primary interest was "not to get a change in the sugar quota or to get a government loan but to win support for his policies from American public opinion."

It was this almost slavish subservience to prevailing majority opinion -- the voice of the mob -- rather than his naive attitude toward Communism and his obvious lack of understanding of even the most elementary economic principles which concerned me most in evaluating what kind of a leader he might eventually turn out to be. That is the reason why I spent as much time as I could trying to emphasize that he had the great gift of leadership, but that it was the responsibility of a leader not always to follow public opinion but to help to direct it in the proper channels -- not to give the people what they think they want at a time of emotional stress but to make them want what they ought to have. I pointed out that it might be very possible that the people of Cuba were completely disillusioned as far as elections and representative government were concerned but that this placed an even greater responsibility on him to see that elections were held at the very earliest date, and thereby to restore the faith of the people in democratic processes. Otherwise, the inevitable result would be the same dictatorship against which he and his followers had fought so gallantly. I used the same argument with regard to freedom of the press, the right to a fair trial before an impartial court, judge and jury, and on other issues which came up during the course of the conversation. In every instance he justified his departure from democratic principles on the ground that he was following the will of the people. I, in my turn, tried to impress upon him the fact that while we believe in majority rule that even a majority can be tyrannous and that there are certain individual rights which a majority should never have the power to destroy.

I frankly doubt that I made too much impression upon him but he did listen and appeared to be somewhat receptive. I tried to cast my appeal to him primarily in terms of how this place in history would be affected by the courage and statesmanship he displayed at this time. I emphasized that the easy thing to do was to follow the mob, but that the right

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-3-

thing in the long-run would be better for the people and, of course, better for him as well. As I have already indicated he was incredibly naive with regard to the Communist threat and appeared to have no fear whatever that the Communists might eventually come to power in Cuba. He said that during the course of the revolution there had been occasions when the Communists overplayed their hand and "my people put them in their place." He implied that this would be the situation in the future in the event that the Communists tried to come to power. As a matter of fact, in his attitude toward Communism, both internally and from an international standpoint, he sounded almost exactly like Sukarno had sounded to me when I visited Indonesia in 1953. In our discussions of Communism I again tried to cast the arguments in terms of his own self-interest and to point out that the revolution which he had led might be turned against him and the Cuban people unless he kept control of the situation and made sure that the Communists did not get into the positions of power and influence. On this score I feel I made very little impression, if any.

Speaking to him from a personal standpoint I urged him at the earliest possible moment to bring good strong men into his government and to delegate responsibilities to them in the economic and other areas where he presently was making many decisions. I tried to point out that unless he did this he would have a workload which would be so great that he could not provide the leadership and the vision that the Cuban people needed for the great issues. I put as much emphasis as possible on the need for him to delegate responsibility, but again whether I got across was doubtful.

It was apparent that while he paid lip service to such institutions as freedom of speech, press and religion his primary concern was with developing programs for economic progress. He said over and over that a man who worked in the sugar cane fields for three months a year and starved the rest of the year wanted a job, something to eat, a house and some clothing and didn't care a whit about whether he had freedom along with it. I of course tried to emphasize that here again as a leader of his people, he should try to develop support for policies which could assure economic progress with freedom rather than without it.

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He indicated that it was very foolish for the United States to furnish arms to Cuba or any other Caribbean country. He said "anybody knows that our countries are not going to be able to play any part in the defense of this hemisphere in the event a world war breaks out. The arms governments get in this hemisphere are only used to suppress people as Batista used his arms to fight the revolution. It would be far better if the money that you give to Latin American countries for arms be provided for capital investment." I will have to admit that as far as his basic argument was concerned here I found little that I could disagree with!

We had a rather extended discussion of how Cuba could get the investment capital it needed for economic progress. He insisted that what Cuba primarily needed and what he wanted was not private capital but government capital. He gave me some rather confused arguments as to why plants that were licensed and/or owned and operated by the government would serve the best interests of Cuba better than privately owned enterprises. I told him quite bluntly that his best hope as far as the United States was concerned was not in getting more government capital but in attracting private capital. I explained that government capital was limited because of the many demands upon it and the budget problems we presently confronted. I pointed out that private capital on the other hand was expansible and that he would be serving the interests of Cuba far better by adopting policies which would attract it. I pointed out that there was competition for capital throughout the Americas and the world and that it would not go to a country where there was any considerable fear that policies might be adopted which would discriminate against private enterprise. At this point he, at considerable length, tried to explain why he had said and done some of the things which had appeared to be anti-private enterprise up to this time. Here again on this point I doubt if I made too much of an impression.

He explained his agrarian reform program in considerable detail justifying it primarily on the ground that Cuba needed more people who were able to buy the goods produced within the country and that it would make no sense to produce more in factories unless the amount of money in the hands of consumers was increased.

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He rather bitterly assailed the United States press for what he called their unfair reporting of the revolution after he came to power. I, of course, tried to explain that speaking from some personal experience, it was necessary to expect and to learn to take criticism both fair and unfair. I would not be surprised if his sensitivity with regard to ~~criticism~~ might eventually lead him to take some rather drastic steps toward curtailing freedom of the press in the future.

He also spoke rather frankly about what he felt was a very disturbing attitude on the part of the American press and the American people generally. His argument went along this line: "yours is a great country -- the richest, the greatest, the most powerful in the world. Your people, therefore, should be proud and confident and happy. But everywhere I go you seem to be afraid -- afraid of Communism, afraid that if Cuba has land reform it will grow a little rice and the market for your rice will be reduced -- afraid that if Latin America becomes more industrialized American factories will not be able to sell as much abroad as they have previously. You in America should not be talking so much about your fear of what the Communists may do in Cuba or in some other country in Latin America, Asia or Africa -- you should be talking more about your own strength and the reasons why your system is superior to Communism or any other kind of dictatorship."

In my turn of course I tried to explain that we welcomed the industrialization and development of Latin America, that one of our best customers was Canada, for example, which was highly industrialized and that as economic conditions improved in any country this was not only good for that country but good for us as well. I also tried to put our attitude toward Communism in context by pointing out that Communism was something more than just an idea but that its agents were dangerously effective in their ability to grasp power and to set up dictatorships. I also emphasized, however, that we realized that being against Communism was not enough -- that it was even more important that we make it by our actions, by what we say and what we do abroad that we convince people everywhere that we want to help them achieve economic progress in a climate of freedom.

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Several other subjects were discussed but none that I think are worth mentioning at this point. Significantly enough, he did not raise any questions about the sugar quota nor did he engage in any specific discussions with regard to economic assistance. His primary concern seemed to be to convince me that he was sincere, that he was not a Communist and that his policies had the support of the great majority of the Cuban people.

My own appraisal of him as a man is somewhat mixed. The one fact we can be sure of is that he has those indefinable qualities which make him a leader of men. Whatever we may think of him he is going to be a great factor in the development of Cuba and very possibly in Latin American affairs generally. He seems to be sincere. He is either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline -- my guess is the former, and as I have already implied his ideas as to how to run a government or an economy are less developed than those of almost any world figure I have met in fifty countries.

But because he has the power to lead to which I have referred, we have no choice but at least to try to orient him in the right direction.

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Appendix G

Memorandum for DCI

[for Briefing Vice President Nixon],

29 Feb 60

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28 Mar 60

29 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans) *Ruby*

SUBJECT: What we are doing in Cuba.

1. This memorandum is for information only, and is for the Director's use at meeting with the Vice President on 2 March 1960.

2. Intelligence

Some highlights of recent intelligence which justify the actions being taken or planned against Cuba are:

a. Rapid build-up of events which indicate slide toward Communist orbit and intensified efforts implement internal programs towards establishment Communist dictatorship. Public feeling among middle and upper class Cubans and students has reached new high on Communist issue and numerous station contacts ranging from left to right have declared that situation cannot be tolerated, and that they are now convinced Communists control Cuba.

b. The Chief of Cuban intelligence activities in Mexico is on a trip through Central America to initiate activities for the establishment of a pro-Castro revolutionary movement in each country aimed at the overthrow of existing government. Cuban Embassies serve as cover.

c. Considerable intelligence has been received of Cuban attempts to establish an operational relationship with guerrilla groups in Colombia with ultimate goal of overthrowing the Colombian government.

d. [ 29 ] reports "Che" Guevara is talking of including Martinique and Guadeloupe in a Caribbean Federation headed by him.

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8 March 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: What we are doing in Cuba.

1. This memorandum is for information only, and is for the Director's use at the NSC 5412 Representatives Meeting which will consider the Cuba covert action program paper. (This paper was used for Mr. Nixon's briefing.)

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~~SECRET~~

[ 29 ] JAP 22 Jan 74